A financial accelerator through coordination failure by de Groot, Oliver
 School of Economics and Finance
Online Discussion Paper Series
issn 2055-303X
http://ideas.repec.org/s/san/wpecon.html
info: econ@st-andrews.ac.uk
A Financial Accelerator through
Coordination Failure
Oliver de Groot
School of Economics and Finance Discussion Paper No. 1902
31 Jan 2019
JEL Classification: D82, E32, E44, G12
Keywords: Financial frictions, DSGE models, Global games, Bank runs,
Unconventional monetary policy, Financial crises
                             1 / 53
 A Financial Accelerator through
Coordination Failure∗
Oliver de Groot†
University of St Andrews & European Central Bank
31 January 2019
Abstract
This paper studies the effect of liquidity crises in short-term debt markets in a dy-
namic general equilibrium framework. Creditors (retail banks) receive imperfect signals
regarding the profitability of borrowers (wholesale banks) and, based on these signals
and their beliefs about other creditors actions, choose whether to rollover funding, or
not. The uncoordinated actions of creditors cause a suboptimal incidence of rollover,
generating an illiquidity premium. Leverage magnifies the coordination inefficiency.
Illiquidity shocks in credit markets result in sharp contractions in output. Policy re-
sponses are analyzed.
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 1 Introduction
Creditors financing a project face a coordination problem. Fear of other creditors not rolling
over funding may lead to preemptive action, undermining the project, and the chance of
repayment to those creditors as well. Coordination problems impact the functioning of many
types of the credit market but often the most visible manifestation of coordination failure
is a bank run.1 At least since Bagehot (1873)’s description of the 1866 financial panic,
economists have acknowledged the inherent fragility of financial intermediaries. Table 1 lists
notable bank runs during the 2007-08 financial crisis. The demise of Northern Rock (UK)
and Lehman Brothers (US), for example, have been interpreted (see Brunnermeier (2009)
and Shin (2009)) as events in which short-term interbank market creditors were unwilling to
continue lending to these institutions, for fear that other creditors were doing likewise.2
This paper makes three contributions. First, it builds a rigorously micro-founded coor-
dination problem in credit markets in a dynamic, general equilibrium macroeconomic model.
Second, the model highlights the role that maturity- and liquidity-mismatch play in the prop-
agation of shocks through the economy. Third, it provides a laboratory to study the effect of
unconventional policy responses to a large scale liquidity dry up, as seen during the 2007-08
financial crisis.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper was the first to model liquidity and bank runs
within a dynamic general equilibrium framework.3 Recently, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)
and Gertler et al. (2016) also studied the macroeconomic implications of bank runs. My
contribution distinguishes itself from these in two important respects. First, in the afore-
mentioned papers bank runs are themselves aggregate shocks to the economy in which the
entire financial sector experiences a run. In reality, as Table 1 suggests, even during a major
financial crisis, only a subset of all financial institutions experience a run. My model cap-
tures this feature. In particular, in any given period the proportion of borrowers in danger
1Coordination problems also impact the market for bank loans, commercial paper, and corporate bonds.
For example, Hertzberg et al. (2011) exploited a natural experiment, which compelled banks to make public
negative private assessments about their borrowers, to quantify the effect of coordination problems. Even
the commercial paper market, primarily for low-default-risk firms, experienced liquidity dry ups, following
the Penn Central bankruptcy (1970), the Russia/LTCM crisis (1998), and the Enron/WorldCom episode
(2002). In 2008, the Fed introduced the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to prevent a market
freeze. No issuers who used the CPFF defaulted on their debt obligations, suggesting the liquidity dry up
was driven by coordination problems rather than increased insolvency risk. Disorderly liquidation of assets is
economically inefficient. In the US, chapter 11 bankruptcy provision is designed to address the coordination
problem among creditors (Jackson (1986)), giving legal protection to a firm to remain in business while being
restructured.
2In practice, it is difficult to disentangle whether the unwillingness of creditors to continue lending hastened
the bankruptcy of an insolvent bank or whether the run scuppered a sound institution. Morris and Shin (2016)
disentangle the two in theory.
3The first version of this paper was circulated in 2010.
1
                             3 / 53
 of experiencing a run is determined by the aggregate state, with the proportion of borrowers
experiencing a run being endogenously countercyclical. Second, runs in the model are deter-
mined by a rigorously microfounded global game. In contrast, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)
and Gertler et al. (2016) use an ad hoc threshold rule (based on the insights from the global
games literature).
Table 1: Notable bank runs during the 2007-08 financial crisis
2007 Aug Countrywide Financial US Wholesale funding run followed by a retail-deposit run.
2007 Sep Northern Rock UK Wholesale funding run followed by a retail-deposit run.
2008 Mar Bear Stearns US Wholesale funding run.
2008 Jul IndyMac US Wholesale funding and brokered-deposit run.
2008 Sep Lehman Brothers US Wholesale funding run.
2008 Sep Washington Mutual US Retail deposit run.
2008 Sep Wachovia US Retail- and brokered-deposit bank run.
In my model, wholesale banks (the borrowers) finance themselves with short-term debt
from a multitude of retail banks (the creditors). I show that coordination problems generate
an equilibrium trade off between the leverage of a borrower and the illiquidity premium paid
on external finance, resulting from a suboptimal incidence of debt rollover. The coordination
problems among creditors amplify business cycle dynamics and illiquidity shocks in credit
markets generate a novel channel for additional volatility in economic activity. I study two
potential policy instruments to dampen the effect of an illiquidity crisis: direct lending to and
equity injections into wholesale banks. I show, for a given dollar amount committed, that
equity injections dampen the contemporaneous effect on economic activity more than direct
lending, but causes output to remain subdued for longer. This is because a dollar of debt
intermediated by the policymaker improves the solvency of a wholesale bank (which largely
determines the extent of the coordination problem) by less than a dollar of additional eq-
uity. However, equity injections disincentivize balance sheet adjustment, slowing the output
recovery following the shock.
Coordination failure arises from two assumptions. One, borrowers have a balance sheet
maturity mismatch with longer maturity (more illiquid) assets and shorter maturity (more
liquid) liabilities. Two, multiple creditors per borrower who cannot coordinate their actions.
When a borrower’s debt matures, each creditor must decide whether to rollover, taking ac-
count of fundamentals and the actions of other creditors. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) study
this coordination problem with depositors as the creditors and find the existence of multiple
2
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 equilibria, one of which is a bank run.4 Such multiple equilibria, however, are problematic for
a general equilibrium framework where the endogenous pricing of a debt contract requires
ex ante knowledge about the probability distribution of ex post outcomes. Global games
offer a solution.5 Multiple equilibria in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is a consequence of the
assumption that creditors’ information sets are perfectly symmetric. By introducing idiosyn-
cratic noise into creditors’ signal of a borrower’s solvency, the global games literature shows
that a unique set of self-fulfilling beliefs prevail in equilibrium. I thus model the coordination
problem in credit markets as a sequence of micro-founded static global games, building on
Morris and Shin (2004), Rochet and Vives (2004), and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005). The
resulting dynamic general equilibrium model allows the study of the macroeconomic effects
of illiquidity shocks and the efficacy of alternative policy interventions.6
Liquidity hoarding and interbank lending during the crisis has been studied Heider et
al. (2015). However, theories of coordination problems in credit markets have received rela-
tively little attention in the macroeconomics literature. The majority of the financial friction
literature has broadly followed two paths which find their roots in the work of Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) (building on the costly state verification (CSV) assumption from Townsend
(1979), in which there is an informational asymmetry in a single borrower-creditor relation-
ship) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) (building on the hold-up assumption of Hart and Moore
(1994), introducing a binding collateral constraint on lending).7 The distortion created by
coordination problems among creditors is a distinct and important feature of credit mar-
kets, especially during the 2007-08 financial crisis. This paper therefore is an important
complementary framework to analyze credit market interventions. Related papers modeling
the policy response of the Fed, Treasury, and other central banks and governments to the
financial crisis in the context of alternative financial frictions include Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011).8
The rest of the paper: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes partial equi-
librium comparative statics of the global game and the dynamic response of the model to
illiquidity shocks. Section 4 analyzes direct lending and equity injections. Section 5 con-
cludes.
4See Gorton and Winton (2003) for a review of the literature Diamond and Dybvig (1983) spawned.
5The seminal contribution is Carlsson and van Damme (1993). For an overview, see Morris and Shin
(2003). Corsetti et al. (2004) apply global games to currency crises.
6Kurlat (2013) and Dang et al. (2012) explain why the market for some assets freeze during crises.
7Seminal contributions include Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999); Iacoviello (2005)
applied financial frictions to the housing market; Christiano et al. (2014) estimated the importance of financial
risk shocks; Carlstrom et al. (2010), Fiore and Tristani (2013), and Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016) analyze
optimal monetary policy with financial frictions; Angeloni and Faia (2013) model macroprudential policy.
de Groot (2016) reviews the financial accelerator literature.
8See also Sargent and Wallace (1982), Reis (2009b), and Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010).
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 2 The model
The model is a canonical real business cycle model in which I embed a coordination problem
facing retail banks in financing wholesale banks.
2.1 Households
A representative household consumes, Ct, supplies labor, Lt, and has preferences given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σCt
1− σC − χ
L1+ρt
1 + ρ
)
. (1)
The household maximizes (1) subject to its budget constraint given by
Ct ≤ WtLt +Rt−1Dt−1 −Dt + Πt, (2)
where Wt is the real wage, Rt is a predetermined risk-free rate on deposits held with retail
banks, Πt are profits (from owning goods producing firms and capital producers). The
household’s first-order conditions are given by
Wt = χL
ρ
tC
σC
t , (3)
1 = βEt (Ct+1/Ct)−σC Rt. (4)
2.2 Capital producers
The production of new capital is subject to adjustment costs. A representative capital
producer takes It consumption goods and transforms them into Ψ (It/I) I units of capital
that it sells at price Qt (where I is the steady state level of investment). I assume the function
Ψ is concave and Ψ(1) = Ψ′(1) = 1 and Ψ′′(1) = −ψ. Profits are given by QtΨ (It/I) I − It.
The producer’s first-order condition is given by
Qt = (Ψ
′ (It/I))
−1
. (5)
The aggregate capital stock at the end of period t is given by
Kt = (1− δ)K∗t + Ψ (It/I) I, (6)
where K∗t is capital available for time t production. This is different from the capital stock at
the end of t− 1 as some is lost due to the costly uncoordinated liquidation of failing banks.
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 2.3 Goods producers
Goods producing firms hire labor and rent capital as inputs to a constant returns to scale
technology to produce output, Yt, given by
Yt = At (K
∗
t )
α L1−αt , (7)
where At is the stochastic level of technology. Output is sold in a perfectly competitive
market at a unit price. The firm’s first-order conditions are given by
MPKt = αYt/K
∗
t , (8)
Wt = (1− α)Yt/Lt, (9)
where MPKt is the marginal product of capital. In the absence of coordination failure,
arbitrage ensures that the discounted expected return on capital equals the risk-free rate
Et
(
(Ct+1/Ct)
−σC RK,t+1
)
= Et
(
(Ct+1/Ct)
−σC)Rt, (10)
where RK,t ≡ (MPKt + (1− δ)Qt) /Qt−1.
2.4 Retail and wholesale banks
The financial sector transforms household savings into financing for firms to rent capital.
Two types of intermediary exist: retail and wholesale banks. Retail banks accept household
savings and lend to wholesale banks who finance firms. By assumption, wholesale banks rely
on short-term debt funding from a large number of retail banks. As a result, retail banks
face a coordination problem in deciding whether to rollover maturing debt.
Wholesale banks Think of them as capital managers. They invest in firms’ capital with
the intention of augmenting the capital with their idiosyncratic productivity and earning
a return from the augmented capital. Formally, there is a continuum of wholesale banks
indexed by w with preferences linear in consumption. At the end of t − 1, a wholesale
bank purchases capital, Kwt−1, at price Qt−1 financed with net worth, Nwt−1, and external
financing from the full continuum of retail banks. This external finance takes the form of
a two-stage intertemporal loan: 1) At an intra-period stage of time t retail banks decide
whether to rollover the loan. 2) Rolled over loans are scheduled for repayment at the end of
t. Thus, a wholesale bank’s balance sheet has a maturity mismatch; its assets (capital) earn
5
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 a return at the end of t but its liabilities (the debt) must be rolled intra-period.9
At the end of t− 1 wholesale banks are homogeneous in all respects except net worth.
Thus, wholesale bank leverage, `t = QtKwt/Nwt, and the terms of the debt contract (such
as the loan rate) will be common across banks. At the beginning of t, wholesale bank w
observes its idiosyncratic productivity that will transform its capital to ωwtKwt−1, where ωwt
is iid across time and space, E (ωwt) = 1, with cdf F , pdf f , and support on [0,∞). The
distribution is assumed to be log-normal and common knowledge. The aggregate return per
unit of productive capital, ωwtKwt−1, is given by RK,t. The contract specifies a non-default
loan rate, RL,t.
10 If a retail bank does not rollover at the intra-period stage, the loan must
be repaid immediately with loan rate R˜L,t = RL,t/RK,t.
11
Table 2: Timing in a given period
1. The aggregate state, {At, λt}, is realized and ω¯t is determined from a state-contingent menu.
2. The idiosyncratic productivity, ωwt, of each wholesale bank is realized.
3. Retail banks receive signals ωrwt and decide whether to rollover funding.
4. Banks with capital use their idiosyncratic productivity, ωwt or γ, to augment their capital.
5. The augmented capital is rented to goods producers at rental rate MPKt.
6. After production, capital is sold to the capital producers at price Qt.
7. Wholesale banks repay retail banks and retail banks repay households.
8. A measure, 1− υ, of wholesale banks exit, consume their profits and a new measure, 1− υ, enter.
9. Wholesale banks buy capital, Kwt, at price Qt using net worth, Nwt, and new external financing.
Suppose all retail banks rollover. It is then possible to define a wholesale bank’s solvency
condition in terms of a cutoff value of idiosyncratic productivity, denoted ω¯t, such that the
9The maturity mismatch is not beneficial per se, as in, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) where some depos-
itors have liquidity needs at the intra-period stage. Instead, the assumed market structure is motivated by
Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013)’s maturity rat race in which a negative externality induces borrowers to
use excessively short-term financing. The externality arises because short maturity claims dilute the value of
long maturity claims, causing a borrower to successively move towards short-term financing, with complete
short-term financing the only stable equilibrium.
10Following Bernanke et al. (1999), the debt contract will have wholesale banks absorb the aggregate risk.
Retail banks hold a portfolio of wholesale bank debt which perfectly diversifies idiosyncratic risk. Thus,
retail banks hold perfectly safe portfolios with a predetermined return that can be passed on to depositors.
Carlstrom et al. (2016) and Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2017) study the consequences of (optimal) state
contingent deposit contracts.
11This assumption reduces the complexity of the debt contract and since RL,t > R˜L,t does not materially
change the behaviour of the model.
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 wholesale bank has just enough resources to repay the loan, given by
ω¯tRK,t`t−1 = RL,t (`t−1 − 1) . (11)
However, retail banks need not rollover. If a retail bank does not rollover, the wholesale
bank pays R˜L,t (Qt−1Kwt−1 −Nwt−1) in units of capital (since the wholesale bank has no
other assets at the intra-period stage), which is equivalent to ω¯tQt−1Kwt−1. Transferring
capital, however, incurs a cost: For every unit of capital transferred at the intra-period
stage, the wholesale bank loses 1 − λt units of capital, where λt ∈ (0, 1) is an exogenous
stochastic measure of the liquidity of wholesale banks’ assets.
When one is forced to sell an asset quickly in an illiquid market, one must content oneself
with a price for the asset below its fundamental value. It is this feature of credit markets
which is captured by λt. Thus, wholesale banks’ balance sheets not only exhibit a maturity
mismatch, but also a liquidity mismatch. The intra-period value of a wholesale bank’s capital
is λtKwt−1 while the claims on the wholesale bank if no retail banks rollover is ω¯tKwt−1. When
the loan rate is such that ω¯t > λt, the wholesale bank is illiquid and vulnerable to a credit
run. Appendix A.2 provides conditions under which ω¯t (which is endogenous) is greater than
λt in equilibrium. Thus, the coordination problem is an endogenous phenomenon.
Retail banks Retail banks are perfectly competitive, accept deposits from households
(paying a risk-free return) and hold a fully diversified portfolio of wholesale banks’ short-term
debt. As described above, retail banks choose whether to rollover loans at an intra-period
stage. By not rolling over, a retail bank receives a fraction of the wholesale bank’s capital and
earns a return by taking over the capital management process (i.e. augmenting the capital
itself and renting the augmented capital to firms).
This section solves the retail banks’ rollover decision rule, conditional on a given debt
contract specified by {`t−1, ω¯t}. At the beginning of t, each retail bank, indexed by r, observes
a noisy signal of each wholesale bank’s idiosyncratic productivity, ωrwt = ωwt + εrwt. The
noise term, εrwt ∼ U (−ε¯, ε¯), is iid across time and space. Given the signals, retail banks
decide individually for each wholesale bank, whether to rollover funding.
A retail bank’s payoff (to rolling over or not) depends on a wholesale bank’s realized
idiosyncratic productivity and on the actions of other retail banks. These payoffs are derived
in Appendix A.2 and given in Table 3, where 1 − pt is the proportion of retail banks that
rollover. γ is the productivity of the retail bank (i.e. the retail banks’ equivalent of ωwt)
and measures the retail banks’ ability to do a wholesale bank’s job. When γ = 0, retail
and wholesale banks are complements in the financial sector—neither can do the others’ job.
When 0 > γ > 1, there is some substitutability with retail banks able to earn a positive
7
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 return from capital management.12
Table 3: Payoffs to retail banks
Rollover Not rollover
ω¯ γω¯ when 0 ≤ p ≤ λ
ω¯
and ω ≥ ω¯(1−p)λ
λ−pω¯
ω
1−p
(
1− pω¯
λ
)
γω¯ when 0 ≤ p ≤ λ
ω¯
and ω < ω¯(1−p)λ
λ−pω¯
0 γλ
p
when λ
ω¯
< p ≤ 1
Note: Payoffs are normalized by RK,tQt−1Kwt−1, and are for a given retail bank’s
action regarding a given wholesale bank. Since the problem is a static, symmetric
game, all time and bank indexes have been dropped.
Table 3, top-left: When the fraction of retail banks not rolling over, pt, is low and the
wholesale bank’s productivity, ωwt, is high, a retail bank that rolls over receives the non-
default return ω¯t. Bottom-left: If however, the retail bank rolls over when a large fraction of
retail banks do not, such that the wholesale bank runs out of capital, the rolled over retail
bank gets zero. Middle-left: This is the intermediate outcome in which the wholesale bank
survives the intra-period stage but cannot fully repay its debt obligation at the end of t.
The right column gives the payoffs from not rolling over. If a retail bank does not
rollover, but few other retail banks do likewise so the wholesale bank does not lose all its
capital, the retail bank receives ω¯t, applies its own productivity, γ, and earns γω¯t. Right-
bottom: If the fraction of retail banks that do not rollover is high, the wholesale bank has
insufficient liquid capital and the liquid capital, λt, is divided equally among the retail banks
that do not roll over, earning γλt/pt.
The payoff structure exhibits strategic complementarities. Up to the critical pt at which
the wholesale bank fails (i.e. runs out of capital), the net payoff from rolling over (i.e. rollover
minus not rolling over) decreases as the fraction of retail banks that do not rollover, pt, rises.
Thus, retail banks face a strategic environment in which higher-order beliefs regarding the
actions of other retail banks are important.
Proposition 1 states that, under certain technical assumptions, a retail bank’s action is
uniquely determined by its signal: It only rolls over if its signal, ωrwt, is above a threshold,
denoted ω∗t .
Proposition 1 There is a unique (symmetric) equilibrium in which a retail banks does not
rollover if it observes a signal ωrwt below threshold ω
∗
t , and rolls over otherwise.
12When γ is sufficiently high, retail banks will have no incentive to lend to wholesale banks since they will
be able to earn a higher return by directly buying and managing capital themselves.
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 The proof is given in Appendix A.2.13 In computing the threshold, ω∗t , observe that a
retail bank with signal ωrwt = ω
∗
t , must be indifferent between rolling over and not. The retail
bank’s posterior distribution of ωwt is uniform over the interval [ω
∗
t − ε, ω∗t + ε]. Moreover,
the retail bank believes that the fraction of retail banks not rolling over, pt, is given by
p (ωw, ω
∗) =

1 ω∗ − εrw > ωw
1
2
+ ω
∗−ωw
2εrw
if ω∗ − εrw ≤ ωw ≤ ω∗ + εrw
0 ωw < ω
∗ + εrw
.
Thus, the posterior distribution of pt is uniform over [0, 1]. In the limit when ε¯ → 0 the
resulting indifference condition is given by14
∫ 1
p= λ
ω¯
−γλ
p
dp+
∫ λ
ω¯
p=0
(
ω∗
1− p
(
1− pω¯
λ
)
− γω¯
)
dp = 0. (12)
where solving for ω∗t leads to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, with the noise component of retail banks’ signals arbitrarily
close to zero, the rollover threshold, ω∗t , is given by
ω∗t = γλtxt (1− ln (xt)) (xt + (1− xt) ln (1− xt))−1 , (13)
where xt ≡ λt/ω¯t. It is a striking result of Proposition 1 that there exists a unique switching
equilibrium, even when the noise term in retail banks’ signals is arbitrarily close to zero. Thus,
in equilibrium, wholesale banks never experience a partial run but experience a complete run
and full rollover with probability F (ω∗t ) and 1− F (ω∗t ), respectively.
To see the inefficiency created by the coordination problem, consider the decision of a
retail bank when it is the sole holder of a wholesale bank’s debt (or, equivalently, a scenario
in which retail banks can costlessly and credibly coordinate their actions).15 If it does not
13The proof requires that there exist lower and upper dominance regions,
[
0, ωL
)
and
(
ωH ,∞), in which
a retail bank would not rollover and rollover, respectively, regardless the actions of other retail banks. This
requirement is discussed in Appendix A.2. When retail banks receive a noiseless signal on the interval[
ωL, ωH
]
, there are multiple equilibria. But, a grain of doubt for retail banks (i.e. ε¯ arbitrarily close to zero)
leads to the starkly different (and very useful) result given in Proposition 1.
14This condition specifies ω∗ for ω∗ < ω¯. The complete indifference condition is given in Appendix A.2.
15There are two benchmarks against which to gauge the inefficiency. The first, applied in the text, is to
assume that creditors can perfectly coordinate their actions. The second is to assume long-term debt. This
eliminates the rollover decision and thus eliminates the coordination problem. A standard RBC model is
akin to this second benchmark. Under the first benchmark, it is efficient to coordinate and not rollover for
wholesale banks with extremely low values of ωwt (i.e. ω
∗
eff > 0). Even after accounting for the liquidation
cost, retail banks’ ability to manage capital means they are able to generate a higher return. It is therefore
possible to rank the three scenarios: Short-term contracts with perfect coordination are preferred to long-term
9
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 rollover it gets γλt and if it rolls over it gets the lesser of ω¯t and ωwt. The optimal action
is to rollover when ωwt > γλt and not rollover otherwise. The efficient, full coordination,
threshold is given by ω∗eff = γλt and is lower than ω
∗
t , implying that, because of coordination
problems, the probability of a run is higher than is optimal. This leads to Propositions 3.
Proposition 3 i) The inefficiency wedge, ω∗/ω∗eff, is increasing in the illiquidity, x = λ/ω¯,
of the wholesale bank: ∂ (ω∗/ω∗eff) /∂x < 0. ii) In the limit, when the wholesale bank is not
illiquid, there is no inefficiency: limx→1 (ω∗/ω∗eff) = 1.
To get a sense of the dynamic implications, suppose the loan rate (and thus ω¯t) moves
countercyclically. This implies that in a recession, for a given λt, the distortionary effects of
coordination problems in the credit market are magnified, generating a financial accelerator.
The contracting problem A debt contract can be characterized by the pair {`t, ω¯t+1}.
Since retail banks are perfectly competitive and pay a predetermined return to depositors,
Rt, the debt contract must satisfy a zero profit break-even condition for the retail banks.
And since retail banks hold fully diversified portfolios of loans, a retail bank’s expected
(normalized) payoff is given by
ω¯
∫ ∞
ω¯
f (ω) dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
i. Rolled over
and pay in full
+
∫ ω¯
ω∗
ωf (ω) dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
ii. Rolled over
and default
+ γλt
∫ ω∗
0
f (ω) dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
iii. Not rolled
over
, (14)
which is an integral over three possible outcomes:16 The wholesale bank i) survives the intra-
period stage and repays its loan in full; ii) survives the intra-period stage but is insolvent
resulting in partial payment; or iii) does not survive and the the retail banks earn a return
managing the capital themselves. We can rewrite (14) as Γt −Gt where
Γ ≡ ω¯
∫ ∞
ω¯
f (ω) dω +
∫ ω¯
0
ωf (ω) dω and G ≡
∫ ω∗
0
(ω − γλt) f (ω) dω. (15)
Thus, 1 − Γt and Γt − Gt are the fraction of gross returns accruing to wholesale and retail
banks, respectively, whereGt captures the deadweight loss resulting from coordination failure.
The contracting problem maximizes the wholesale banks’ return subject to the retail
banks’ break even condition, given by
max
`t,ω¯t+1
Et (1− Γt+1)St+1`t s.t. (Γt+1 −Gt+1)St+1`t ≥ (`t − 1) , (16)
contracts, but long-term contracts are preferred to short-term contracts without coordination.
16This assumes ω∗t < ω¯t. See Appendix A.2 for when this does not hold.
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 where St ≡ RK,t/Rt−1. The constraint holds for all realizations of RK,t+1 because the retail
banks’ return, Rt, is assumed to be predetermined. The combined first-order condition
(substituting out the Lagrange multiplier) is given by
Et
(
dΓt+1
dΓt+1 − dGt+1
)
= Et
(
St+1
(
1 +
Γt+1dGt+1 − dΓt+1Gt+1
dΓt+1 − dGt+1
))
, (17)
where dΓt ≡ ∂Γt/∂ω¯t and dGt ≡ ∂Gt/∂ω¯t. The break-even condition from (16) and equation
(17) combine to implicitly define a loan supply schedule that has the following form
EtSt+1 = θ
(
`t
(+)
, λt
−
)
, (18)
where EtSt+1 is denoted the illiquidity premium. The illiquidity premium is increasing in
wholesale banks’ leverage and decreasing in the intra-period liquidity of capital. Endogenous
fluctuations in leverage and exogenous fluctuations in liquidity generate a time-varying wedge
between the expected return on capital and the risk-free rate in the economy.
2.5 Closing the model
Aggregation is straightforward since, at the end of a period, wholesale banks are only het-
erogenous in net worth but choose a common leverage ratio and face the same interest rate
on loans. Net worth of wholesale banks are its end-of-period profits. A fraction 1 − υ of
wholesale banks are the forced to exit the market and consume their profits while a measure
1 − υ of new wholesale banks enter. In addition, all wholesale banks receive a positive but
arbitrarily small lump-sum tranfer from households. These two assumptions ensure that i)
wholesale banks do not accumulate sufficient net worth to no longer need external finance
and ii) the net worth of every wholesale bank is positive and the contracting problem is well
defined. It follows that the evolution of aggregate net worth, Nt, is given by
Nt = υ ((1−Gt)St`t−1 − (`t−1 − 1))Rt−1Nt−1. (19)
The deadweight cost of coordination failure is in units of capital. Thus, while the aggregate
stock of capital purchased in t − 1 for use in t is Kt−1, only K∗t = (1−Gt)Kt−1 is put to
productive use. Aggregate wholesale bank consumption of exiting bankers is given by CW,t =
1−υ
υ
Nt. Finally, the economy’s aggregate resource constraint is given by Yt = Ct + CW,t + It.
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 3 Results
3.1 Comparative statics
This section analyzes the comparative static properties of the static coordination failure
model. In particular, it shows the interplay between liquidity, coordination problems, leverage
and the illiquidity premium before the full dynamic properties of the model are explored.
In the next subsection, the full model is carefully parameterized to capture moments
in US aggregate data. For the present comparative static exercises, the following stylized
parameterization is used: γ = λ = 0.4, ω¯ = 0.5, and σ2 = 0.35, where ln (ω) ∼ N (−1
2
σ2, σ2
)
.
These parameter values aid graphical illustration without altering the qualitative properties
of the quantitatively parameterized model presented in the next section.
Figure 1: Net payoff function
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Note: Set γ = λ = 0.4 and ω¯ = 0.5. This gives ω∗ = 0.3275. The left and right panels set ω = ω∗ ± 0.1. ω∗
is the value of ω that equalized the shaded area above and below the line.
The red line in Figure 1 plots the net payoff function to rolling over for various ω values.
The payoff function exhibits two important features: A single crossing where the net payoff
to rolling over is zero, and a negative slope, which implies strategic complementarities. In the
left-panel (low ω), the equilibrium action is to not rollover whereas in the right-panel (high
ω), the equilibrium action is to rollover. The middle panel defines the threshold ω∗ (solving
the indifference condition in (12)), which is when the sum of the blue areas equals zero.
Figure 2 plots the behaviour of ω∗ and ω∗eff as γ, λ, and ω¯ are altered, respectively.
In Section 2, I focused the model’s derivation on a specific region of the parameter space,
which I term the mild fragility scenario. However, as Appendix A.2 describes in detail, the
model generates four scenarios: 1) No fragility, 2) Mild fragility, 3) Acute fragility, and 4)
No rollover. These are represented in Figure 2 by the shaded areas from white to dark green,
respectively. In the middle panel, when λ is sufficiently high (white region), there is no
12
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 Figure 2: Comparative statics for ω∗
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Note: Set γ = λ = 0.4 and ω¯ = 0.5. The shaded areas from white to dark-green represent Scenario 1) No
fragility; 2) Mild fragility; 3) Acute fragility; and 4) No rollover.
coordination problem: Retail banks base their rollover decision on their private signal alone
and not on higher order beliefs about other retail banks’ actions. The pale green region is
the mild fragility scenario that is the focus of this paper. In this scenario, ω∗ < ω¯. A fall in
liquidity, (i.e. a lowering of λ) raises the rollover threshold and lowers the efficient rollover
threshold, thus increasing the inefficiency generated by the coordination problem. When λ
falls further, the economy enters the acute fragility scenario in which ω∗ > ω¯. Notice the
curvature of the red line. In this scenario, the rollover threshold becomes very sensitive to
small changes in liquidity. And, as a result, the proportion of wholesale banks that experience
a run, F (ω∗), also increases dramatically (blue-dot line). Finally, when the liquidity of the
capital stock is extremely low, there is a no rollover scenario, in which case rollover never
occurs and the market effectively fails to exist. Clearly, there are interesting nonlinearities
in this model, but which are beyond the scope of the current paper to explore further. This
paper focuses on perturbations of the model in the light-green (mild fragility) region. One
can think of the model of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler et al. (2016) as studying
large jumps from the white (no fragility) region to the dark-green (no rollover) region.
Figure 3 plots the debt contract, showing how the return on capital is split between
the borrower and creditor for different realizations of the wholesale bank’s idiosyncratic ω.
Top-left panel: A textbook debt contract has the creditor receiving the area Γ (·) = B + C
and the borrower receiving the residual: 1 − Γ (·) = A. Short-term debt and coordination
failure generates a deadweight cost given by G (·) = C − D. C is a loss since retail banks
would have received a higher return if all retail banks had rolled over for these realizations
of ω. D is a gain resulting from the existence of short-term debt: The retail bank receives a
higher return for these realizations of ω relative to the case in which all debt contracts were
13
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 Figure 3: Debt contract
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Note: Top-left: Γ (·) = B+C and 1−Γ (·) = A. Deadweight cost given by G (·) = C −D. Top-right panel is
probability-weighted. Bottom-left: Comparative static of a rise in illiquidity (i.e. fall in λ from λH to λL).
The deadweight cost rises (i.e. area C −D expands). Bottom-right: Comparative static of a rise in ω¯ from
ω¯L to ω¯H . The deadweight cost again increases.
long-term. The top-right panel shows the same panel but probability-weighted and shows
that, given the distributional assumptions, area D is negligible. The bottom-left panel shows
the effect of a rise in illiquidity caused by a fall in λ from 0.4 to 0.3. As a result, ω∗ rises
and the deadweight cost rises (i.e. the area C −D expands). The bottom-right panel shows
the effect of an exogenous rise in the lending rate, with ω¯ rising from 0.5 to 0.55. This also
increases ω∗ and the deadweight cost of coordination failure.
Figure 4 plots the supply curve of loanable funds by translating the deadweight costs
of coordination failure studied above into a tradeoff between wholesale banks’ leverage and
the illiquidity premium they pay on external finance. This is done by endogenizing ω¯. The
14
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 Figure 4: Illiquidity premium and leverage
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Note: Set γ = λ = 0.4, ω¯ = 0.5 and σ = 0.35. CF denoted coordination failure model. CSV denotes the
costly state verification model of Bernanke et al. (1999) with monitoring cost parameter µ = 0.166.
left panel shows that if wholesale banks have low leverage (green line), then there is no
coordination problem for retail banks and as a result the illiquidity premium is zero. However,
as leverage rises above a critical value then the coordination problem appears (red line),
generating an illiquidity premium which is increasing in leverage. An interesting comparison
is with an alternative model of financial frictions, the costly state verification (CSV) model
of Townsend (1979). In this model, costly state verification generates a risk premium even
for low levels of leverage but grows more gradually (blue-dot line). The implication of this
comparison is that the CSV-type risk premium is larger during normal times (when leverage
is relatively low) than the CF-type illiquidity premium, but in periods of financial stress when
borrower net worth falls and leverage sharply rises, then illiquidity premium rise rapidly and
can even become larger than typical risk premia.
The right panel shows the effect of a fall in liquidity. When λ falls, the loanable funds
supply schedule shifts inward and steepens, resulting in a higher illiquidity premium for a
given leverage ratio. The next section studies the dynamic effect of such an illiquidity shock.
3.2 Parameterization
Table 4 list the calibrated and estimated parameters. The model parameters are partitioned
into three groups. The first group of parameters are results from previous studies. The
second group are calibrated using steady state relationships.
Following Basu and Bundick (2017), the third group of parameters are estimated. These
15
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 Table 4: Structural parameters
α 0.33 χ 5.02‡ σa 0.0055† υ 0.981‡
β 0.99 ρ 3 ρa 0.868
† σ2 0.048‡
δ 0.025 ϕ 0.273† σλ 0.0041† γ 0.589‡
σC 2.0 ρλ 0.893
† λ 0.703‡
Note: Parameters with ‡ are calibrated to match steady state moments. Parameters with †
are estimated using simulated method of moments to match US aggregate data moments.
parameters are chosen to minimize the distance between the model moments and moments
in US aggregate data. Formerly, the estimator is the solution of the following problem
J = min
θ
(
MD −M (θ))′W−1 (MD −M (θ)) , (20)
where MD denotes a vector that comprises the unconditional variances and autocorrelations
of output, consumption, investment, hours worked and the illiquidity premium in the data
and M (θ) denotes its model counterpart and θ = {ϕ, σa, ρa, σλ, ρλ}. W is a diagonal matrix
that contains the standard errors of the data moment estimates.
Based on standard values in the literature at a quarterly frequency, the subjective
discount factor is β = 0.99, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/σC = 2.0, the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is ρ = 3 and the depreciation rate of capital is
0.025. The weight on leisure in the utility function, χ is chosen such that steady state labor
supply is normalized to 1.
The financial sector is governed by four structural parameters: The capital manage-
ment productivity of retail banks, γ, the steady-state intra-period liquidity of capital, λ, the
variance of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, σ2, and the proportion of wholesale banks
that survive each period, υ. The values are pinned down by four steady state moments of
the model that approximately match long-run averages in US data, given in Table 5.
One, I use the TED spread, which is the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the
3-month Treasury bill, as a proxy for the illiquidity premium. LIBOR is the rate banks charge
each other for lending. Since the coordination problem in the lending relationship between
retail and wholesale banks is the only wedge between the return on deposits and the return
on capital in this model, the TED spread is a good proxy for the illiquidity premium. For
comparison, Figure 5 plots the TED spread alongside the Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012a)
excess bond premium, which is significantly larger but captures a much broader definition
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 Figure 5: Illiquidity premium and bank failure
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Note: TED is the spread between 3-month LIBOR and the 3-month Treasury bill. GZ-EBP is the excess
bond premium from Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012a). PC is a liquidity premium calculated from 7 spread
series using principal components analysis following Bredemeier et al. (2018). Bank failure source: FDIC.
Shaded areas denote NBER recession dates.
of credit spreads/risk premiums. The figure also plots an alternative measure of the liquid-
ity premium, which takes the principal component of seven spreads between the return on
Treasuries and illiquid assets of similar safety and maturity. This follows the methodology
of Bredemeier et al. (2018) (see Appendix C for details).17 Thus, I match the steady state
illiquidity premium to the mean of the TED spread from 1986-2017, which is 58bp.
Two, Figure 5 also plots a time-series of bank failures, which I constructed from FDIC
data. The series goes back to 1934 but for consistency with the other time-series, I use
only the period 1986-2017. In the model, the fraction of banks that fail and the fraction of
failures weighted by balance sheet size are equivalent. In the data, however, these series are
quite different. In particular, at the peak of the 2007-08 financial crisis, 2% of banks covered
by the FDIC failed but this accounted for 9% of total deposits. In addition, there were a
large number of bank failures in the aftermath of the crisis in 2010-12 but these were mainly
small banks. Thus, the series for bank failures in terms of total deposits appears much less
persistent. For the empirical exercise, I use the measure of bank failures and as a share of
deposits. The mean annualized failure rate from 1986-2017 was 0.67%.
Three, leverage in the wholesale bank sector varies widely across financial institutions,
with some banks with leverage in excess of 10. I take a conservative estimate and calibrate
the steady state leverage of the wholesale bank sector to be 4 following Gertler et al. (2012).18
17Robustness exercises using this series are available on request.
18While the deterministic steady state is, by definition, independent of uncertainty, it is likely that wholesale
banks’ (privately) optimal leverage is dependent on the risk they face on their balance sheet. Gertler et al.
(2012) and de Groot (2014) investigate how leverage at the risk-adjusted steady state can rise (and hence
amplify the financial accelerator) in a low risk environment.
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 Finally, the average recovery ratio of liquidated assets is set at 50% following estimates from
Berger et al. (1996).
Table 5: Targeted steady state moments
Moment Description Value
RK −R Illiquidity premium† 58bp (ann.)
F (ω¯) Bank failure rate†† 0.67% (ann.)
K/N Capital-to-net worth ratio 4‡∫ ω∗
0
γλ
ω f (ω) dω Average recovery ratio of liquidated assets 50%
‡‡
Note: † TED spread; †† source: FDIC; ‡ Gertler et al. (2012). ‡‡ Berger et al. (1996).
The remaining five parameters are estimated using simulated method of moments. The
following 10 moments are included: The standard deviation and autocorrelation of output,
consumption, investment, hours, and the TED spread. Four of the five parameters are the
persistence and standard deviation of the two exogenous shock series: Technology, At, and
liquidity, λt. The final parameter, ϕ, controls investment-adjustments costs. This is a key
parameter for determining the strength of the financial accelerator. When ϕ is zero, the
financial accelerator is generally weak because investment demand adjusts rapidly to changes
in financial conditions.19 The success of the model in matching the business cycle moments is
reported in Table 6. Given the parsimony of the model, it does a reasonable job of matching
business cycle moments. Most notably, hours worked are too volatilite and consumption is
too persistent. However, the model captures well the properties of the TED spread.
3.3 Impulse responses and crisis scenario
Technology shocks Figure 6 shows the reaction to a 1% negative technology shock.20 The
blue-solid and green-dot lines show the reaction of the model with and without coordination
failure, respectively. Coordination failure does not significantly alter the qualitative shapes
of the responses, but does alter the magnitude of the responses. Notably, the drops in
investment, asset prices and the capital stock are magnified.
19The model is solved to first-order in the neighborhood of the deterministic steady state. The model,
however, admits interesting non-linearities as shown in Section 3. Although it would be a fruitful avenue for
future research to solve the model using global methods, it is beyond the scope of the current paper.
20Supplementary material on other shocks (e.g. capital quality and net worth shocks) and the behaviour
of the rollover threshold, recovery, default, and rollover rates are available on request.
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 Table 6: Business cycle moments
Moment Data Model Moment Data Model
std(GDP) 1.060 1.051 ac(GDP) 0.862 0.786
std(C) 0.864 0.686 ac(C) 0.820 0.965
std(I) 4.418 4.154 ac(I) 0.931 0.714
std(Hours) 0.478 0.794 ac(Hours) 0.792 0.676
std(TED) 0.410 0.359 ac(TED) 0.796 0.651
Note: Construction of data moments given in Appendix C.
Figure 6: Technology shock
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Note: 1% negative technology shock
Coordination failure introduces three new aggregate variables of interest: Wholesale
bank net worth and leverage and the illiquidity premium. The negative technology shock
causes a drop in wholesale bank net worth and an increase in wholesale bank leverage. The
risk-free (deposit) rate falls while the expected return on capital rises, leading to a sharp rise
in the illiquidity premium.21 These responses are the result of three features of coordination
21The countercyclical leverage ratio is a feature of most financial accelerator models. Adrian et al. (2013)
criticize the financial accelerator models for failing to capture the procyclical leverage ratio in the US data.
However, Gertler (2013) argues that the discrepancy is due to differences in the way net worth is measured in
the data relative to the model. In the model, net worth is measured in terms of market values. In the data,
in contrast, equity is measured using a mixture of book and fair value accounting, and even then, during
periods of market illiquidity, even fair value accounting replaces market values with a “smoothed” value.
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 failure. First, the loan rate paid by wholesale banks is a function of the expected return
on capital, which means that the wholesale banks absorb the aggregate risk. When the
negative technology shock hits, the realized return on capital is below its expected return,
which drives down the aggregate wholesale bank profits and hence their net worth. Second,
wholesale bank net worth decreases faster than the demand for capital, implicitly causing
leverage to rise. Third, higher leverage increases the severity of the coordination problem
among retail banks, causing the illiquidity premium to rise. As a result, retail banks demand
a higher loan rate (i.e. an increase in ω¯t) following a negative productivity shock, which
increases the illiquidity of wholesale banks yet further. This causes investment and the price
of capital to fall further in response to a negative technology shock. Investment falls 3.8%
on impact following a 1% technology shock in the coordination failure model, relative to a
2.0% in the frictionless case.
Illiquidity shock A novel feature of the model is the ability to generate an exogenous
rise in illiquidity in credit markets. Figure 7 shows the response to a 1% rise in intra-period
capital illiquidity with an iid (red-dash) and a persistent shock (blue-solid line), respectively.
Figure 7: Illiquidity shock
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Note: 1% illiquidity shock
A rise in the illiquidity of capital leads to a rise in the rollover threshold, ω∗, implying
a higher incidence of bank runs. This causes a sharp rise in the illiquidity premium paid by
wholesale banks on external finance. The rise in the illiquidity premium is the result of both
a rise in the expected return on capital as well as a fall in the risk-free deposit rate. The
retail banks cut back on the supply of loanable funds. However, the drop in the demand for
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 capital is insufficient to offset the fall in wholesale bank net worth. In order to break even,
the retail banks lower the return paid on deposits. Households, facing a lower return on
savings, generates a temporary consumption boom.22 In the transition back to steady state,
the fall in the demand for investment causes a decline in the capital stock. As the impact of
the illiquidity shocks recedes, households cut consumption order to restore their steady state
savings ratio. This requires a long period of deleveraging by wholesale banks.
The size and persistence in the response of capital (and hence output) is sensitive to
the persistence of the exogenous rise in illiquidity. The evolution of capital is relatively
gradual. A less persistent shock therefore gives less opportunity for capital to fall and do
serious damage to potential output. Thus, the length and severity of a recession depends on
how long the credit market remains illiquid.
This model has several features unique to coordination failure. First, retail banks’ are
most likely to run when liquidity is most needed. Second, as the constraints on wholesale
banks tighten countercyclically, the share of capital held by retail banks will move counter-
cyclically. This occurred during the financial crisis with dealer banks in the shadow banking
sector shrinking and commercial banks expanding their market share.
Illiquidity during the 2007-08 financial crisis In this section, I provide an illiquidity
shock narrative of the 2007-08 financial crisis as an external validation exercise for the model.
Since the model is a parsimonous RBC model, chosen for clarity rather than quantitative
accuracy, it is unlikely to provide a close fit to the data. However, the exercise provides a
good way of assessing its strengths and weaknesses.
In this exercise, I suppose the economy was hit by a sequence of illiquidity shocks from
2007q2–2008q4 that match the evolution of the illiquidity premium (TED spread) in the
data. Using simple projection methods, I estimate a distribution of counterfactual paths
for output, investment, the illiquidity premium and bank failure had the financial crisis not
occurred. The black line in Figure 8 represents the deviation between the actual path for these
variables and the median of the counterfactual path. The methodology follows Christiano et
al. (2015) and is described in Appendix C. The grey area captures the uncertainty in these
counterfactual paths. The counterfactual evolution of output is most uncertain while the
bank failure rate is estimated very precisely (i.e. without the financial crisis, the bank failure
rate would have almost certainly remained at zero).
22The implication is that when an illiquidity shocks hits, consumption rises temporarily while output and
investment fall. This is because of a high intertemporal elasticity of substitution for households which means
that the substitution effect dominates the wealth effect. This result is shared by many other papers which
incorporate shocks to preferences, investment goods prices or other financial frictions. A possible extension
to the model to alleviate this result is to assume that technology shocks and illiquidity shocks are correlated.
Indeed, during recessions, markets do seem to experience more illiquidity.
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 Figure 8: Illiquidity shocks during the 2007-08 crisis
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Note: Black lines represent the data relative to an uncertain trend using following Christiano et al. (2015).
Black-dash line is the Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012b) EBP. Red line is the model prediction with illiquidity
shocks chosen to match exactly the TED spread from 2007q2–2008q4.
The model’s illiquidity shocks captures well the fall in output during the financial crisis
although only around a third of the drop in investment, suggesting that investment specific
shocks also played an important role. The model captures well the peak bank failure rate of
9%. However, the model predicts that bank failures would have appeared as early as 2007
and would have persisted into 2010. Thus, when integrating over the total number of bank
failures for the 2007-2010 period, the model overpredicts the number of bank failures.
Of course, there is a clear rationale for policymakers (monetary or fiscal) to offset the
effect of illiquidity in the credit market, to which we turn in the next section.
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 4 Policy responses
The coordination failure model facilitates the analysis of two unconventional credit market
policies adopted by the US Federal Reserve during the 2007-08 financial crisis: 1) Direct
lending (or liquidity injections) in credit markets and 2) equity injections.23
4.1 Direct lending (DL)
In this scenario, the policymaker supplements private lending in credit markets with addi-
tional lending directly to wholesale banks with abnormal excess returns. Since wholesale
banks in the model are funded by a continuum of retail banks, the retail banks cannot coor-
dinate actions. The policymaker instead behaves as a single, large market participant with
deep pockets. By committing to rollover, it is able to reduce the coordination problem.24
Let nt denote the proportion of total lending to wholesale bank w provided by retail
banks. Funding provided by the policymaker is therefore given by (1− nt) (QtKwt −Nwt).
Retail banks can still choose not to rollover while the policymaker is assumed to always
rollover.25 The policymaker lends at the prevailing market rate RL,t. However, by expanding
the supply of run-free funds available in the market, it reduces the loan rate endogenously.
The new rollover threshold, augmented by direct lending, is given by
ω∗ = γλnx (1− ln (x)) / (nx+ (1− nx) ln (1− nx)) , (21)
where x ≡ λ/ (nω¯) is the new measure of endogenous illiquidity. The efficient rollover thresh-
old becomes ω∗eff = γλ/n. It is straightforward to show that, all else equal, direct lending
increases the efficient threshold while ω∗ falls, thus reducing the market distortion.26 Retail
banks’ break-even condition is unchanged except for the deadweight cost, Gt, given by
G =
∫ ω∗
0
(ω − γλ/n) f (ω) dω. (22)
23Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010), Reis (2009a) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) also model the effect of
credit market policies.
24In other respects, the government is likely less efficient at intermediating funds. Thus, think of this as
only a crisis measure.
25In the crisis, the Fed implicitly lengthened the maturity structure of banks’ borrowing by directly
lending at longer maturities than private agents were willing to lend. See the Fed’s press release:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081007c.htm
26In fact, a sufficiently large intervention will push the economy into the “no fragility” region described in
Appendix A.2. This scenario is not considered here.
23
                            25 / 53
 4.2 Equity injections (EI)
In this scenario, the policymaker acquires part ownership of wholesale banks.27 I assume that
government equity and private equity has the same characteristics. Let ct be the proportion
of total equity that is privately held by wholesale bankers, such that the funds injected by the
government are given by (1− ct)Nt. The retail banks’ break-even condition is unchanged
but wholesale bank profits are split between the wholesale bankers and the government in
proportion to ct. The augment net worth equation is given by
Nt =
ct−1
ct
υ ((1−Gt)St`t−1 − (`t−1 − 1))Rt−1Nt−1.
Since equity injections expand wholesale bank net worth, this will expand credit creation,
reduce leverage ratios, and lower the illiquidity premium.
4.3 The policy rule
The policymaker obtains funds by levying lump sum taxes on households.28 Returns from
direct lending and equity are also transferred lump sum to households. The aim is to assess
the relative power of the two alternative instruments and so this simplification facilitates a
clean comparison. The government flow budget constraint is given by
Tt = (1− nt−1)
(
Γt −
∫ ω∗t
0
ωf (ω) dω
)
RK,tQt−1Kt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Return on direct lending
+ (1− ct−1) (1− Γt)RK,tQt−1Kt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Return on equity injections
− (1− nt) (QtKt −Nt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct lending
− (1− ct)Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Equity injections
, (23)
where Tt are lump-sum transfers net of taxes. Note the policymaker does not receive the
same return on direct lending as retail banks. Since the policymaker commits to always
rollover, it loses γλt to banks that still experience a run.
The policymaker has two policy instruments available, ct and nt. I consider a simple
and implementable reaction function that governs the use of these instruments given by
nt = 1− aDL (EtSt+1/S − 1) and ct = 1− aEI (EtSt+1/S − 1) , (24)
27I abstract from efficiency costs associated with government acquisition of equity
28The lump sum taxes/transfers should more realistically be modelled as central bank reserves when com-
paring to developments during the financial crisis. However, the additional realism adds unnecessary com-
plexity to the model without materially altering the comparison of the policy instruments.
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 where aDL, aEI ≥ 0. Thus, the size of the policy intervention depends positively on the illiq-
uidity premium. The rule is reasonable since the magnitude of the distortion the policymaker
is trying to offset is proxied by the illiquidity premium. The rule is also practically imple-
mentable since credit spreads are observable (although disentangling illiquidity risk from
credit risk may not be so easy). After all, it was the sharp rise in spreads during the financial
crisis that pushed the Fed into introducing unconventional credit policies, even before the
conventional tool of monetary policy, the nominal interest rate, reached the zero lower bound.
4.4 Illiquidity shock with policy responses
Figure 9 shows a 1% fall in the intra-period liquidity of the capital stock. To provide a clear
comparison between policy instruments, the experiment ensures that both policies deliver
the same initial cost to the government in term of GDP. This requires the parameters of the
policy rules to be set at aDL = 3.00 and aEI = 14.02.
29
Figure 9 shows that equity injections mitigate the effects of the initial shock to liquidity
better than direct lending. The initial fall in output with no policy intervention was 0.35%.
Equity injections and direct lending reduced this to 0.11% and 0.27%, respectively. The
reason is that equity injections directly offset the fall in net worth, actually causing leverage
to fall. However, while equity injections reduce the initial impact of the illiquidity shock, they
also cause the effects of the shock to persist for longer. The reason is as follows: Without
coordination problems, the Modigliani-Miller theorem states the irrelevance between debt
or equity financing. But, with coordination problems, the shadow price of equity is lower,
exactly because equity avoids the coordination problem. Wholesale banks build up equity
so that they don’t require debt finance. Direct lending, even though it reduces the maturity
mismatch, does not materially improve the solvency of the wholesale banks. Equity injections
are therefore powerful in mitigating the problem in credit markets (because it lowers the need
to access them). However, as the illiquidity premium recedes, the policymaker’s withdrawal
of equity offsets the recovery in net worth that the wholesale bank would have experienced
in the counterfactual scenario without policy intervention.
5 Conclusion
This paper incorporates short-term uncoordinated creditors in credit markets in a dynamic,
general equilibrium setting. The coordination problem generates a time-varying incidence of
bank runs, rising during downturns and especially during periods of illiquidity. The resulting
29In terms of quantities, the size of the initial intervention in these experiments is 0.6% of annual GDP, or
for the US economy, approximately $90bn. The Fed’s balance sheet expanded by $1tn during the crisis.
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 Figure 9: Illiquidity shock and policy response
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Note: 1% illiquidity shock with policy intervention
illiquidity premium provides a new lense through which to study the financial accelerator
and the role of credit market interventions during financial crises. In particular, the model
shows that equity injections are more powerful policies than direct lending.
Moreover, the microfounded coordination problem at the heart of this model provides
rich nonlinearities that this current research has not yet fully explored and will likely be a
fruitful avenue for future research.
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 A ONLINE APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
A.1 Financial frictions via costly state verification
As has been alluded to in several places above, the model with coordination failure generates
a similar set of reduced form aggregate equilibrium relationships as the financial accelerator
model of Bernanke et al. (1999) from very different microfoundations. Specifically, coordina-
tion problems among creditors, like Bernanke et al. (1999) generates a risk spread between
internal and external finance related to the endogenous evolution of borrowers’ (wholesale
banks here, entrepreneurs in Bernanke et al. (1999)) leverage. However, the two models are
quite distinct in terms of the understanding of the key features of credit market dynamics.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess which of the credit market frictions—
coordination failure or bankruptcy costs—is empirically more relevant, it is instructive to
provide a rigorous comparison of the two models, and highlight how the empirical work
could distinguish between these two mechanisms. The Bernanke et al. (1999) model offers a
second benchmark (in addition to the frictionless real business cycle benchmark in Section
2) from which to assess the role of coordination failure.
To this end, a stripped down version of Bernanke et al. (1999)’s model appropriate for
direct comparison is presented. The financial friction in Bernanke et al. (1999) is the result of
a costly state verification (CSV) assumption, first introduced by Townsend (1979). In their
model, debt also matures every period, but unlike the coordination failure model, there is no
possibility of early foreclosure by retail banks. Instead, the friction is the result of an informa-
tional asymmetry between borrowers (entrepreneurs in this case) and retail banks (the credi-
tor). At the end of a period, an entrepreneur knows his gross profits, ωt+1 (e)R
E
t+1QtKt+1 (e).
The retail bank however, does not. As before, the non-default threshold for an borrower
is given by ω¯t+1. Suppose the borrower declares that his gross profits were less than the
contractual amount owed to the retail bank, and therefore claims to only be able to pay a
fraction of his debt obligation. Does the retail bank believe this? How does the retail bank
respond? In the costly state verification model, the retail bank is able to pay a monitoring
cost in order to observe the entrepreneur’s gross profits. The monitoring cost is assumed
to be a proportion of gross profits, µωt+1 (e)R
E
t+1QtKt+1 (e), with 0 < µ < 1. It turns out
that the borrower has the incentive to truthfully reveal his gross profits if the retail bank
commits to monitoring the borrower whenever the borrower is insolvent: ωt+1 (e) < ω¯t+1.
When monitoring is costless, µ = 0, the model reduces to the frictionless real business cycle
benchmark. At the other extreme, when µ = 1, the credit market ceases to function. If
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 however 0 < µ < 1, the expected gross return to the retail bank from lending is given by:ω¯ ∫ ∞
ω¯
f (ω) dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
i. Returns on debt
that pays in full
+ (1− µ)
∫ ω¯
0
ωf (ω) dω︸ ︷︷ ︸

ii. Returns on debt that
doesn’t pay in full net of
monitoring costs
REt+1QtKt+1 (e)
Rewrite the expected gross profits accruing to the retail bank as:
(
Γ (ω¯)−GCSV (ω¯))REt+1QtKt+1 (e)
where Γ (·) is as in Section 2.4 and GCSV (·) is:
GCSV (ω¯) = µ
∫ ω¯
0
ωf (ω) dω (25)
The borrower’s break-even condition under the coordination failure and costly state verifica-
tion assumptions are clearly similar, except in the interpretation and functional form of the
financial friction, GCSV (ω¯) under CSV and GCF (ω¯ (ω
∗)) under coordination failure (CF).
Under costly state verification, GCSV (ω¯) is the expected monitoring (or agency) cost while
in Section 2.4, GCF (ω
∗ (ω¯)) was the cost of coordination failure. The differences in the en-
dogenous responses of these two frictions to the same aggregate shocks is what distinguishes
the dynamics of the two model economies.
Setting up the borrower’s Lagrangian similar to that in Section 2.4 to solve for the
menu of state-contingent equilibrium debt contracts under CSV gives:
EtREt+1
Rt+1
= ΞCSV
(
QtKt+1
Nt+1
)
(26)
where Ξ′CSV (·) > 0 and Ξ′′CSV (·) > 0. This equation exhibits the same functional form as
equation (??); the external finance premium,
EtREt+1
Rt+1
is increasing and convex in the whole-
sale bank’s capital to net worth ratio. The reason for this relationship under costly state
verification is that the expected monitoring costs rise as the ratio of borrowing to net worth
increases. In the next section, it will be shown that it is the curvature of this function that
will be the key distinction between the two models, and their dynamics.
As a result of the asymmetry of information, competitive wholesale banks are able to
earn informational rents, leading the evolution of aggregate net worth to follow:
Nt+1 = υ
(
REt Qt−1Kt −Rt (Qt−1Kt −Nt)
)
+ TE
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 There is a small discrepancy between the net worth equations under coordination failure
(see equation (19)) and costly state verification, above. This discrepancy results from the
way in which the costs (whether coordination costs or agency costs) are realized. Under
coordination failure, the cost was a loss in units of productive capital. Under costly state
verification, the monitoring costs are paid in terms of units of output. Thus, under costly
state verification, K∗t = Kt for all t, but the aggregate resource constraint becomes:
Yt = Ct +Gt + It + C
E
t + µ
(∫ ω¯t
0
ωf (ω) dω
)
REt Qt−1Kt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deadweight cost of monitoring
A.2 The coordination game
This appendix retraces many of the technical aspects of Section 2.4 to ensure completeness
by adding additional proofs, details and explanations. Subscripts and indexes have been
dropped wherever possible to aid clarity.
A.2.1 Construction of payoffs in Table 3
This subsection explains the construction of the payoff matrix for retail banks in Table 3.
Suppose a wholesale bank owns one unit of raw capital, of which only 0 < λ < 1 units are
liquid. Suppose a fraction 0 < p < 1 of retail banks do not rollover. The debt contract offers
a retail bank that does not rollover ω¯ units, leaving the wholesale bank with{
1− pω¯
λ
if pω¯ ≤ λ
0 if pω¯ > λ
units of raw capital. A retail bank that does not rollover then owns{
ω¯ if pω¯ ≤ λ
λ
p
if pω¯ > λ
units of raw capital. Thus, the wholesale bank fails at the intra-period stage (i.e. looses
all its capital to retail banks that do not rollover) if the fraction of retail banks that do not
rollover, p, is in the interval
(
λ
ω¯
, 1
]
. When p ∈ ( λ
ω¯
, 1
]
the raw liquid capital, λ, is divided
equally among the retail banks that do not rollover.
The wholesale and retail banks have productivity ω and γ, respectively. They use their
productivity to transform the raw capital into effective capital (i.e. capital that can be rented
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 to firms). The wholesale banks and the retail banks that did not rollover therefore hold{
ω
(
1− pω¯
λ
)
0
and
{
γω¯ if pω¯ ≤ λ
γλ
p
if pω¯ < λ
The debt contract offers rolled over retail banks a non-default gross return on ω¯ units of
effective capital. If the wholesale bank fails at the intra-period stage, a rolled over retail
bank receives 0. If the wholesale bank survives the intra-period stage, a rolled over retail
bank receives the gross return on the following units of effective capital:{
ω¯ if ω
(
1− pω¯
λ
) ≥ (1− p) ω¯
ω
(1−p)
(
1− pω¯
λ
)
if ω
(
1− pω¯
λ
)
< (1− p) ω¯
The second line states that if the wholesale bank generates a gross return lower than its debt
obligation to the rolled over retail banks, the gross return will be shared equally among the
rolled over retail banks. In Table 3, the if statement is rearranged as follows: ω ≥ λ(1−p)ω¯
(λ−pω¯) .
Finally, the wholesale bank, as the residual claimant on the gross returns, receives the gross
return on the following units of effective capital:{ (
ω
(
1− pω¯
λ
)− (1− p) ω¯) if ω ≥ λ(1−p)ω¯
(λ−pω¯)
0 if ω < λ(1−p)ω¯
(λ−pω¯)
if it survives the intra-period stage. If the wholesale bank fails at the intra-period stage it
earns zero gross return. This completes the description of the payoff matrix in Table 3.
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 1
When ω is not common knowledge, the game played by retail banks each period in deciding
whether to rollover is a global game. A general proof that the game described in Section
2.4 has a unique (symmetric) switching equilibrium (given in Proposition 1) is provided in
Morris and Shin (2003). This subsection simply identifies the characteristics of the model
that fit the conditions for Morris and Shin’s proof.
The game described in Section 2.4 has a continuum of retail banks. Each retail bank
receives a private signal, x, and has to choose an action, a ∈ {n, r} (not rollover or rollover).
All retail banks have the same payoff function, u, where u (a, p, ω) is a retail bank’s payoff if
it chooses action a, if a fraction, p, of the other retail banks choose to not rollover, and the
state is ω. To analyze best responses, it is enough to know the net payoff of rollover vs. not
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 rollover. The net payoff function, pi, is given by
pi (p, ω) ≡ u (r, p, ω)− u (n, p, ω) .
The state, ω, is drawn from a continuously differentiable and strictly positive density. Im-
portantly, the payoffs in Table 3 satisfy conditions 4-9 given below:
Condition 4 State monotonicity:
The net payoff function, pi (p, ω), is nondecreasing in ω.
Condition 5 Action single crossing:
For each ω ∈ R, there exists a p∗ such that pi (p, ω) < 0 if p < p∗ and pi (p, ω) > 0 if p > p∗.
Condition 6 Uniform limit dominance:
There exist ωL ∈ R, ωH ∈ R, and ε ∈ R++, such that 1) pi (p, ω) ≤ −ε for all p ∈ (0, 1] and
ω ≤ ωL; and 2) pi (p, ω) > ε for all p ∈ (0, 1] and ω ≥ ωH .
Condition 7 Monotone likelihood property:
If x¯ > x, then h (x¯− ω) /h (x− ω) is increasing in ω, where h (·) is the distribution of the
noise term.
Condition 8 Continuity:∫ 1
p=0
g (p) pi (p, ω) dp is continuous with respect to the signal x and density g (·).
Condition 9 Strict Laplacian state monotonicity:
There exists a unique ω∗ solving
∫ 1
p=0
pi(p, ω∗)dp = 0.
Morris and Shin (2003) (see page 67-70 and Appendix C) prove the following result
which can be applied to this setting: Let ω∗ be defined as in Condition 9. The coordination
game played by retail banks has a unique (symmetric) switching strategy equilibrium, with
a retail bank choosing rollover if x > ω∗ and foreclosure if x < ω∗.
Condition 4 states that the incentive to rollover is increasing in ω. Thus, a retail bank’s
optimal action will be increasing in the state, given the other retail banks’ actions. Condition
5 states that the net payoff function should only cross zero once. Thus, the payoff matrix does
not need to exhibit strategic complementarities (i.e. exhibit action monotonicity) across the
full range of p. It does however have to satisfy this weaker single crossing condition (referred
to by Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) as one-sided strategic complementarities). It is clear
from Table 3 that the net payoff, pi(p, ω), is decreasing in p ∈ (0, p†), where p† = λ
ω¯
, is the
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 critical mass of foreclosing retail banks at which the wholesale bank fails at the intra-period
stage. Above p† the net payoff is increasing in p but remains negative.
Condition 6 requires that not rolling over is a dominant strategy for sufficiently low
states, and rollover is a dominant strategy for sufficiently high states. In other words, there
must be ranges of extremely good and extremely bad realizations of ω, for which a retail
bank’s best action is independent of its beliefs concerning other retail banks’ behaviour. The
lower region is when ω is so low that it is better for a retail bank to not rollover, even if all
other retail banks rollover, and occurs when ω < ωL = γω¯. Thus,
[
0, ωL
)
denotes the lower
dominance region. Similarly, I assume an upper dominance region (ωH ,∞] in which a retail
bank would rollover, independent of its beliefs about other retail banks’ actions. Strictly
speaking, the payoff matrix in Table 3 does not exhibit an upper dominance region. To
implement the upper dominance region, I assume that there exists an external large economic
agent (private or public) that would be willing to buy the wholesale bank out and pay its
liabilities when ω is within the upper dominance region. The two dominance regions are
just extreme ranges of the fundamentals at which retail banks’ behaviour is known. This is
important because in the choice of an equilibrium action for a given signal, retail banks must
take into account the equilibrium actions at nearby signals. Again, these actions depend on
the equilibrium actions taken at further signals, and so on. Eventually, the equilibrium must
be consistent with the known behaviour at the dominance regions. Importantly though, the
position of the equilibrium threshold point, ω∗ does not depend on the exact specifications
of the two regions. It is therefore possible to be agnostic about the exact details of the upper
dominance region, with ωH arbitrarily high. Although the payoff matrix in Table 3 does
not have an upper dominance region, a number of natural economic stories can justify the
assumption that if ω was sufficiently large, all retail banks would have a dominant strategy
to rollover.
Condition 7 is a technical restriction on the noise distribution, which is satisfied by the
uniform distribution assumed. Condition 8 is a weak continuity property that is satisfied
despite a discontinuity in the payoffs at p† = λ
ω¯
. Finally, Condition 9 is used to find the
unique threshold equilibrium.
A.2.3 The rollover decision
Section 2.4 explains the rollover decision for an equilibrium debt contract under the baseline
parameterization of the model. The description in Section 2.4, however, is an incomplete
characterization of the decision rule for retail banks for all theoretically feasible values of
γ, λ ∈ (0, 1) and ω¯ ∈ (0,∞). It is possible to separate the decision rule into four scenarios,
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 depending on the values of γ, λ, and ω¯.30 1) The no fragility case when λ
ω¯
< 1; 2) the mild
fragility case when λ
ω¯
< 1 but ω∗ < ω¯; 3) the acute fragility case when λ
ω¯
< 1 and ω∗ > ω¯;
and 4) the no rollover case when no rollover occurs with probability 1.
Scenario 1: No fragility, λ ≥ ω¯ In this scenario, the wholesale bank is never illiquid
at the intra-period stage. Even if p = 1 (i.e. no retail banks rollover) every retail bank
is guaranteed the contractual ω¯ units of raw capital, and the wholesale bank always has a
positive level of raw capital with which to continue operating after the intra-period stage.
The payoff matrix in this scenario is given in Table 7.
Table 7: No fragility scenario
Rollover Not rollover
ω¯ γω¯ if ω ≥ ω¯(1−p)λ
λ−pω¯
ω
(1−p)
(
1− pω¯
λ
)
γω¯ if ω < ω¯(1−p)λ
λ−pω¯
If ω > γω¯ it is optimal for all retail banks to rollover. If 0 < ω < γω¯, all retail banks
can guarantee a return γω¯ by not rolling over. However, p = 1 is not the equilibrium. If
all but one retail bank does not rollover the return to the retail bank that rolled over is ω¯.
Instead, there is a mixed equilibrium. Retail banks will not rollover up to the point at which
the payoff to rolling over and not is equalized. The equilibrium fraction that do not rollover,
p‡, implicitly solves
ω
(1− p‡)
(
1− p
‡ω¯
λ
)
= γω¯ → p‡ = λ
ω¯
(γω¯ − ω)
(γλ− ω) < 1.
This means that when the wholesale bank is not fragile to the possibility of a run, there is no
symmetric rollover threshold. In terms of payoffs though, it means that all retail banks are
guaranteed the no rollover return γω¯ (although some retail banks will earn this gross return
by rolling over).
30The decision rule is conditional on ω¯. When deciding whether to rollover, a retail bank takes ω¯ as
given. Thus, we consider the full range of ω¯ ∈ (0,∞) at this stage. However, ω¯ is an endogenous object. In
equilibrium, a large subset of possible ω¯ values are never chosen by optimizing agents.
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 Scenario 2 & 3: Mild and acute fragility, λ < ω¯ In this case, the indifference condition
in equation (12) generalizes to
−
∫ 1
p= λ
ω¯
γλ
p
dp+
∫ λ
ω¯
p=0
({
ω¯ if ω∗ > λ(1−p)ω¯
(λ−pω¯)
ω∗
(1−p)
(
1− pω¯
λ
)
if ω∗ ≤ λ(1−p)ω¯
(λ−pω¯)
}
− γω¯
)
dp = 0, (27)
where the rollover threshold, ω∗, is the implicit solution to this indifference condition, which
reduces to
0 = γ
λ2
ω¯
(
ln
(
λ
ω¯
)
− 1
)
+
{
ω∗
ω¯
λ+ ω∗
(
1− λ
ω¯
)
ln
(
1− λ
ω¯∗
)
if ω∗ ≤ ω¯
λ+ ω∗
(
1− λ
ω¯
)
ln
(
1− λ
ω∗
)
if ω∗ > ω¯
When ω∗ = ω¯, the two lines coincide. A rearranged version of the top line is equation (52) in
Section 2.4. Thus, the main text presents the result where ω∗ ≤ ω¯, termed Scenario 2) mild
fragility. Under this scenario there is an inefficiency due to the fact that ω∗ > ω∗eff. However,
a wholesale bank that experiences a run is technically already insolvent.
Under Scenario 3) acute fragility, ω∗ > ω¯, even solvent wholesale banks face illiquidity
and the risk of a run. While no closed-form solution exists for ω∗ when ω∗ > ω¯, a comparison
of the effect of ω¯ on ω∗ at the shift from mild to acute fragility is possible. First, using (52),
rewrite the inequality ω∗ < ω¯ as
1
γ
<
(
λ
ω¯
)2 (
1− ln ( λ
ω¯
))(
λ
ω¯
+
(
1− λ
ω¯
)
ln
(
1− λ
ω¯
)) .
The right-hand-side (rhs) as a function of λ/ω¯ can be shown to be negatively sloped with
lim (λ/ω¯ → 0) rhs = +∞ and lim (λ/ω¯ → 1) rhs = 1. Thus, when γ is close to 1 (i.e. the
retail banks are good capital managers and close substitutes for the wholesale banks) the
wholesale bank is acutely fragile even when its balance sheet is not very illiquid (i.e. when
λ/ω¯ is close to 1). Second, ω∗ is always increasing in ω¯:
∂ω∗ (ω¯)
∂ω¯
=

γ( λω¯ )
2−( λω¯+ln(1− λω¯ ))ω
∗
ω¯
λ
ω¯
+(1− λω¯ ) ln(1− λω¯ )
> 0 if ω∗ ≤ ω¯
1− λ
ω∗
1− λ
ω¯
λ
ω∗ (γ
λ
ω¯
−1)−ln(1− λω∗ )
λ
ω∗ +(1− λω∗ ) ln(1− λω∗ )
> 0 if ω∗ > ω¯
This means that the rollover threshold, ω∗, rises with solvency threshold, ω¯. In addition, it
is possible to show that the rate at which ω∗ increases with ω¯ is higher when ω∗ > ω¯. If the
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 decision rule in (52) is extrapolated to ω∗ > ω¯, then
∂ω∗ (ω¯)
∂ω¯
∣∣∣∣
mild
<
∂ω∗ (ω¯)
∂ω¯
∣∣∣∣
acute
when ω∗ > ω¯,
which states that the rollover threshold and the inefficiency cost of coordination failure rises
more rapidly in ω¯ when there is acute fragility.
Scenario 4: No rollover, λ < ω¯ This is when Condition 9 is violated (i.e. lim
ω∗→∞
∫ 1
p=0
pi(p, ω∗)dp <
0). The boundary between the acute fragility and no rollover scenarios solves
lim
ω∗→∞
γλ
λ
ω¯
(
ln
(
λ
ω¯
)
− 1
)
+ λ+ ω∗
(
1− λ
ω¯
)
ln
(
1− λ
ω∗
)
< 0,
which reduces to
1 < γ
(
1− ln
(
λ
ω¯
))
. (28)
Since the term in brackets is greater than 1 and increasing in the wholesale bank’s illiquidity,
λ
ω¯
, it implies that when γ is very high, there is no threshold solution, even for relatively low
levels of illiquidity. In this scenario, retail banks do not rollover with probability 1.
A.2.4 Complete characterization of equilibrium payoffs
This section gives a complete characterization of the expected gross returns accruing to both
the wholesale and the retail banks, normalized by RKQK. The expected payoff to a retail
bank is given by
ω¯
∫∞
ω¯
f (ω) dω +
∫ ω¯
γω¯
ωf (ω) dω + γω¯
∫ γω¯
0
f (ω) dω if no fragility
ω¯
∫∞
ω¯
f (ω) dω +
∫ ω¯
ω∗ ωf (ω) dω + γλ
∫ ω∗
0
f (ω) dω if mild fragility
ω¯
∫∞
ω∗ f (ω) dω + γλ
∫ ω∗
0
f (ω) dω if acute fragility
γλ if no rollover
The expected payoff to the wholesale bank is given by
∫∞
ω¯
(ω − ω¯) f (ω) dω if no fragility∫∞
ω¯
(ω − ω¯) f (ω) dω if mild fragility∫∞
ω∗ (ω − ω¯) f (ω) dω if acute fragility
0 if no rollover
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 Using the notation, Γ (·) ≡ ω¯ ∫∞
ω¯
f (ω) dω+
∫ ω¯
0
ωf (ω) dω, it is possible to rewrite the expected
gross returns for the wholesale and retail banks as 1−Γ (·)−H (·) and Γ (·)−G (·), respectively,
where H (·) and G (·) are defined as the expected cost of coordination failure for the wholesale
and retail banks, respectively. The G (·) and H (·) functions are given as follows:
G (·) =

∫ γω¯
0
(ω − γω¯) f (ω) dω if no fragility∫ ω∗(ω¯)
0
(ω − γλ) f (ω) dω if mild fragility
(ω¯ − γλ) ∫ ω∗
ω¯
f (ω) dω +
∫ ω¯
0
(ω − γλ) f (ω) dω if acute fragility
−ω¯ ∫∞
ω¯
f (ω) dω − ∫ ω¯
0
ωf (ω) dω + γλ if no rollover
and
H (·) =

0 if no fragility
0 if mild fragility∫ ω∗(ω¯)
ω¯
(ω − ω¯) f (ω) dω if acute fragility∫∞
ω¯
(ω − ω¯) f (ω) dω if no rollover
with derivatives
∂G (ω¯)
∂ω¯
=

−γF (γω¯) if no fragility
(ω∗ − γλ) f (ω∗) ∂ω∗
∂ω¯
if mild fragility
F (ω∗)− F (ω¯) + (ω¯ − γλ) f (ω∗) ∂ω∗
∂ω¯
if acute fragility
−1 + F (ω¯) if no rollover
and
∂H (ω¯)
∂ω¯
=

0 if no fragility
0 if mild fragility
− (F (ω∗)− F (ω¯)) + (ω∗ − ω¯) f (ω∗) ∂ω∗
∂ω¯
if acute fragility
−1 + F (ω¯) if no rollover
A.3 The contracting problem
This section shows the debt contracting problem in Section 2.4 produced a positive monotonic
relationship between the illiquidity premium and leverage ratio. The theory is developed for
the case of no aggregate risk. The details in this section follow closely the contracting problem
described in Section A.1. of Bernanke et al. (1999).
Let the gross rate of return on the value of a unit of effective capital equal RK . Capital
is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, ω ∈ [0,∞) with E (ω) = 1. Assume F (x) = Pr (ω < x)
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 is a continuous probability distribution with F (0) = 0 and denote by f (ω) the pdf of ω.
The equilibrium contract specifies ω¯. In equilibrium the retail banks earn an expected return
equal to
(Γ (·)−G (·))RKK = R (K −N) ,
where Γ (·) is the gross share of the returns, RKK, going to the retail banks. The net share of
the returns going to the retail banks is Γ (·)−G (·) and the share going to the wholesale banks
is 1−Γ (·)−H (·), where both G (·) and H (·) are expected deadweight costs of coordination
failure. By definition, 0 < Γ (·) < 1. The assumptions made above imply that
Γ (·)−G (·) > 0 for all ω¯ ∈ (0,∞) ,
and
lim
ω¯→0
Γ (·)−G (·) = 0, lim
ω¯→∞
Γ (·)−G (·) = γλ.
Differentiating Γ (·)−G (·) there exists an ω¯ such that:
Γ′ (·)−G′ (·) Q 0 forω¯ R ω¯,
implying that the net payoff to the retail bank reaches a global maximum at ω¯. It is also
possible to show that
(Γ′ +H ′)G′′ + Γ′H ′′ − (Γ′′ +H ′′)G′ − Γ′′H ′ > 0 for ω¯ < ω¯,
which will guarantee an interior solution. The contracting problem may now be written as
max
K,ω¯
(1− Γ−H)RKK s.t. (Γ−G)RKK = R (K −N) .
Next, denote the illiquidity premium as follows: s ≡ RE
R
. Owing to constant returns to scale,
the the capital to net worth ratio, k ≡ K
N
, can be used as the choice variable. Defining V as
the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint, the FOCs are given by
ω¯ : Γ′ +H ′ − V (Γ′ −G′) = 0,
k : (1− Γ + V (Γ−G)) s− V = 0,
V : (Γ−G) sk − (k − 1) = 0.
Since Γ − G is increasing on (0, ω¯) and decreasing on (ω¯,∞), the retail bank never chooses
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 ω¯ > ω¯. The FOC w.r.t. ω¯ implies the Lagrange multiplier, V , can be written as a function
of ω¯, given by
V (ω¯) =
Γ′ +H ′
Γ′ −G′ .
Taking derivatives gives
V ′ =
(Γ′ +H ′)G′′ + Γ′H ′′ − (Γ′′ +H ′′)G′ − Γ′′H ′
(Γ′ −G′)2 > 0 forω¯ < ω¯,
and taking limits gives
lim
ω¯→0
V (ω¯) = 1 and lim
ω¯→ω¯
V (ω¯) = +∞.
The FOCs then imply that ω¯ satisfies
s (ω¯) =
V
1− Γ−H + V (Γ−G) , (29)
where s is the illiquidity wedge between the rate of return on capital and the risk-free de-
manded by retail banks. Taking derivatives gives
s′ = s
V ′
V
(
1− Γ−H
1− F −H + V (Γ−G)
)
> 0 for ω¯ < ω¯,
and taking limits gives
lim
ω¯→0
s (ω¯) = 1 and lim
ω¯→ω¯
s (ω¯) =
1
Γ (ω¯)−G (ω¯ (ω∗)) <
1
γ
.
Thus, this guarantees a one-to-one mapping between the optimal ω¯ and the illiquidity pre-
mium, s. I introduce the following additional assumption:
1
Γ (ω¯)−G (ω¯ (ω∗)) <
1
γ
.
If this condition does not hold, then it is possible that the illiquidity premium is so high
that retail banks could earn a higher return by cutting out the wholesale banks and buy and
manage capital directly.31
31When aggregate risk is introduced, the restriction on the illiquidity premium is weakened, since retail
banks still want to insulate households from the aggregate risk. Suppose we decompose RK into uERK ,
where u is iid over time and Eu = 1 and cov (u,ERK) = 0. Thus, the realization of RK is decomposed into
its expected value and its stochastic element. Suppose the support on u is
(
umin, umax
)
. Then we need to
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 The FOCs also give
k (ω¯) = 1 +
V (Γ−G)
1− F −H . (30)
Taking derivatives gives
k′ =
V ′
V
(k − 1) + Γ
′
1− F −Hk > 0 forω¯ < ω¯,
and taking limits gives
lim
ω¯→0
k (ω¯) = 1 and lim
ω¯→ω¯
k (ω¯) = +∞.
Combining (29) and (30) expresses the illiquidity premium as an increasing function of the
capital to net worth ratio:
s = Ξ (k) with Ξ′ (·) > 0.
Section A.3 of Bernanke et al. (1999) extend the derivation to show that the relationship
between s and k is still monotonically increasing with the introduction of aggregate risk.
assume that uminERK/R < 1/γ, which is a weaker condition.
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 B ONLINE APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
B.1 Model summary
This Section provides the details of the full DSGE model including the specific distribution
assumptions for ω; the steady state of the system of equilibrium equations; and the full
log-linearized system.
B.1.1 The distribution of ω
The distribution of ω is assumed to be log-normal. Specifically, ln (ω) ∼ N (−1
2
σ2, σ2
)
with
E (ω) = 1 and
E (ω | ω > x) =
1− Φ
(
1
σ
(
lnx− σ2
2
))
1− Φ ( 1
σ
(
lnx+ σ
2
2
)) , (31)
where Φ (·) is the cdf of the standard normal. It follows that under the mild fragility scenario
(see Section A.2), Λ (·) and G (·) are given by
Γ (ω¯) = ω¯ (1− Φ (z¯)) + Φ (z¯ − σ) , (32)
G (ω¯) = Φ (z∗ − σ)− γλΦ (z∗) , (33)
and where z¯ and z∗ are related to ω¯ through z¯ ≡ (ln ω¯ + σ2/2) /σ and z∗ ≡ (lnω∗ (ω¯) + σ2/2) /σ,
respectively. Differentiating with respect to ω¯ gives
Γ′ (ω¯) = (1− Φ (z¯))− ω¯φ (z¯) z¯′ + φ (z¯ − σ) z¯′, (34)
G′ (ω¯) = φ (z∗ − σ) z∗′ω∗′ − γλφ (z∗) z∗′ω∗′, (35)
where z¯′ = 1/ (σω¯) and z∗′ = 1/ (σω∗).
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 B.1.2 Equilibrium conditions
The full set of equilibrium conditions is given below. The non-financial block is given by
1 = βEt (Ct+1/Ct)−σC Rt, (Euler condition) (36)
χL1+ρt = (1− α)YtC−σCt , (Labour market) (37)
Yt = At ((φtKt−1))
α L1−αt , (Production function) (38)
RK,t =
αYt/ (φtKt−1) + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
, (Return on capital) (39)
Kt = (1− δ)φtKt−1 + (It/I)
1−ϕ − ϕ
1− ϕ I (Capital accumulation) (40)
Qt = (It/I)
ϕ (Price of capital) (41)
Yt = Ct + CW,t + It, (Aggregate resource constraint) (42)
In the frictionless model, φt = 1, CW,t = 0, and 1 = βEt (Ct+1/Ct)−σC RK,t+1. The financial
block is given by
Et
(
dΓt+1
dΓt+1 − dGt+1
)
= Et
(
St+1
(
1 +
Γt+1dGt+1 − dΓt+1Gt+1
dΓt+1 − dGt+1
))
(FOCs) (43)
1 = (1− (Γt −Gt)St) `t−1 (Break-even) (44)
Nt = υ (φtSt`t−1 − (`t−1 − 1))Rt−1Nt−1 (Net worth) (45)
CW,t =
1− υ
υ
Nt (46)
St = RK,t/Rt−1 (47)
`t = QtKt−1/Nt−1 (48)
Γt = ω¯t (1− Φ (z¯t)) + Φ (z¯t − σ) , (49)
Gt = Φ (z
∗
t − σ)− γλΦ (z∗t ) , (50)
φt = 1−Gt (Deadweight) (51)
ω∗t = γλtxt (1− ln (xt)) / (xt + (1− xt) ln (1− xt)) (52)
xt = λt/ω¯t (53)
z¯t = ln (ω¯t) /σ + σ/2 (54)
z∗t = ln (ω
∗
t ) /σ + σ/2 (55)
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 where all the derivatives are given by
dΓt = (1− Φ (z¯t))− ω¯φ (z¯t) dz¯t + φ (z¯t − σ) dz¯t, (56)
dGt = φ (z
∗
t − σ) dz∗t dω∗t − γλφ (z∗t ) dz∗t dω∗t , (57)
dz¯t = 1/ (ω¯tσ) (58)
dz∗t = 1/ (ω
∗
t σ) (59)
dω∗ =
(
γx2t − (xt + ln (1− xt))ω∗t /ω¯t
)
/ (xt + (1− xt) ln (1− xt)) (60)
Finally, the exogenous stochastic process are given by
At = A
ρA
t−1e
σAεA,t (Technology) (61)
λt = λ
1−ρλλρλt−1e
σλελ,t (Liquidity) (62)
(63)
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 B.1.3 Non-stochastic steady state
The non-stochastic steady state is given below. Equation (36) gives R = β−1 and (41) gives
Q = 1. χ is chosen to normalize L = 1. Note that φ ≈ 1. Equation (39) gives
Y
K
= φ (RK − 1 + δ) /α, (64)
and (38) gives K = (Y/K)1/(α−1). Equation (40) gives I
K
= 1− φ (1− δ). Next, I
Y
= I
K
/ Y
K
.
Equation (42) gives C/Y = 1− 1−υ
υ
N − I/Y . Equation (37) gives
(1− α)Y = θC−σC . (65)
The financial block, (43), (44), and (45), is given by
S =
dΓ
dΓ (1−G)− (1− Γ) dG,
S =
1
Γ−G
`− 1
`
,
1 = ν (φS`− `+ 1) /β.
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 B.1.4 First-order approximation
The (log)-linear approximation of the model in the neighbourhood of the non-stochastic
steady state is given below. The non-financial block is given by
ct = Etct+1 − (1/σC) rt (Euler condition) (66)
yt = (1 + ρ) lt + σCct (Labor market) (67)
yt = at + α
(
φ˜t + kt−1
)
+ (1− α) lt (Production function) (68)
rk,t =
B1
B1 +B2
(
yt − kt−1 − φ˜t
)
+
B2
B1 +B2
qt − qt−1 (Return on capital) (69)
kt = φ (1− δ)
(
φ˜t + kt−1
)
+ (1− φ (1− δ)) it (Capital accumulation) (70)
qt = ψit (Price of capital) (71)
yt =
C
Y
ct +
CW
Y
nt +
I
Y
it (Aggregate resource constraint) (72)
where B1 ≡ αY/ (φK) and B2 = 1 − δ. In the frictionless model, φ˜t = nt = 0 and ct =
Etct+1 − (1/σC)Etrk,t+1. The financial block is given by
(Etrk,t+1 − rt) = N
K
Γω¯Gω¯ω¯ − Γω¯ω¯Gω¯
Γω¯ (Γω¯ −Gω¯) ω¯Et
˜¯ωt+1 + (N
K
Gω¯λ
(Γω¯ −Gω¯) +GλβRK
)
λEtλ˜t+1
+
(
N
K
Gω¯n
(Γω¯ −Gω¯) +GnβRK
)
nnt+1. (73)
Break even condition:
0 =
Γω¯ω¯
1− Γ ˜¯ωt −GλβRKKN λλ˜t −GnβRKKN nnt
+
(
Γ−G
1− Γ
Γω¯
Γω¯ −Gω¯
)
(rk,t − rt−1)− (qt−1 + kt−1 − nt−1) . (74)
The elasticity of the external finance premium with respect to the capital to net worth ratio,
χ, calculated in Section 3.3 is derived by rolling forward equation (74) by one period and
substituting into (73) and eliminating ˜¯ωt.
Net worth:
nt = υ
(
φRKK
N
(
rk,t + b1 ˜¯ωt + b2λ˜t + b3nt)−R(K
N
− 1
)
rt +
(φRK −R)K
N
(qt−1 + kt−1) +Rnt−1
)
− ct + ct−1.
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 Price of capital: Technology and illiquidity shock processes:
at = ρaat−1 + σaεa,t & λ˜t = (1− ρλ)λ+ ρλλ˜t−1 + σλελ,t.
Government debt accumulation:
dg,t =
1
β (1 + x)
dg,t−1 − τ
′N
1 + x
ct +
(1− Γ)RKK
1 + x
ct−1 − τ
′ (K −N)
1 + x
nt +
(Γ− pol)RKK
1 + x
nt−1.
Policy rules:
nt = −aDL (Etrk,t+1 − rt) and ct = −aEI (Etrk,t+1 − rt) .
C Data
C.1 Illiquidity premium
As a robustness check, in addition to using the TED spread, I also construct a measure of
the liquidity premium following Bredemeier et al. (2018). In particular, I collect quartlery
data from 1982-2018 from http://fred.stlouisfed.orf to construct seven spreads between
Treasuries and illiquid assets of similar safety and maturity:
1. 3m AA NFC commerical paper rate - 3m Treasury
2. BoA US corporate 1-3y - 3y Treasury
3. BoA US corporate AAA - 5y Treasury
4. Moody’s Aaa corporate bond - 10y Treasury
5. Moody’s Baa corporate bond - 10y Treasury
6. Certificates of deposit 3m - 3m Treasury
7. Certificates of deposit 6m - 6m Treasury
Next, I construct a factor model with all spreads to extract a common component over
time using principle component analysis. Let ft be the resulting factor and let LPt be the
liquidity premium. These are related by LPt = a + bft, where a and b are unknown. To
recover these parameters, I make the following two assumptions: 1) Following Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), the liquidity premium in 2007q2 equalled 46bp. 2) Following
Del Negro et al. (2017), the peak liquidity premium in 2008q4 was 342bp.
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 C.2 Calibration using simulated method of moments
Using Basu and Bundick (2017) code, a subset of the model parameters are estimated using
simulated method of moments to match the unconditional volatility and persistence of output
and its components, hours worked and the TED spread. Formely, the estimator is the solution
of the following problem
J = min
θ
(
MD −M (θ))′W−1 (MD −M (θ)) , (75)
where θ is a vector of parameters to be estimated, MD denotes a vector that comprises the
data moments and M (θ) denotes its model counterpart. W is a diagnoal matrix with the
empirical standard errors of the estimated moments. The length of the moment vector must
be weakly greater than the length of the parameter vector. In this case, I have 10 moments
and 5 parameters.
C.3 Data transformations
For calculating data moments, I use the logged and HP-filtered transformation of the following
variables
• Output is real GDP (FRED code: GDPC1) divided by civilian noninstitutional popu-
lation, Popt (CNP16OV)
• Consumption is nominal personal consumption expenditure (PCEC), deflated by the
the GDP implicit price deflator, Pt (GDPDEF) and divided by Popt.
• Investment is nominal fixed private investment (FPI), deflated by Pt and divided by
Popt.
• Hours worked is the nonfarm business sector average weekly hours (PRS85006023),
divided by Popt.
• TED spread (TEDRATE).
To calculate the bank failure rate time-series, I collected data from the FDIC website:
https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30Header=1. This provides a time-
stamp and balance sheet data for every bank covered by the FDIC that has failed from
1934-2018. I construct two series: 1) counts the number of bank failures per quarter and the
total number of banks in the US, to construct a failure rate. 2) aggregates the total deposits
of the failing banks and the total deposits in the US banking system, to construct a failure
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 rate. This second measure better accounts for the heterogeneity in bank size across the US
banking sector.
C.4 Counterfactual data projections
To examine how the US economy would have evolved absent the financial crisis, I adopt the
approach of Christiano et al. (2015). For each variable, I fit a linear trend from date τ to
2007q2, where τ ∈ {1985q1, 2003q1}. I then extrapolate the trend line for each variable.
Then, for each τ , I calculate the difference between the projected value of each variable and
its actual value. Figure 8 plots the min, max, and median of these difference paths.
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